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Rules for Donations to Tissue Banks — What Next?
Leonard Glantz, J.D., Patricia Roche, J.D., and George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Michael Crichton’s Next1 is a fictional creation of 
multiple catastrophes emanating from the real-
life case of John Moore, in which the California 
Supreme Court ruled in 1990 that Moore did not 
own his cells after they were removed from his 
body.2 As human tissue has become commer-
cially useful, and as tissue banks storing and 
providing samples for research have flourished, 
the question of who owns the tissue has become 
more vital. Next got mixed reviews, but even many 
scientists, such as Michael Goldman, who re-
viewed the book in Nature, agree with Crichton 
that it is imperative that we “establish clear 
guidelines for the use of human tissue” in medi-
cal research.3 Legal opinions from Florida4 and, 
most recently, Missouri5 supplement the Moore 
case and together provide a foundation on which 
to build these guidelines.
The C ase of John Moore
In 1976, John Moore was treated for hairy cell 
leukemia by hematologist–oncologist David W. 
Golde at the University of California at Los Ange-
les (UCLA). As is standard procedure for the 
treatment of this disease, Golde recommended 
the removal of Moore’s spleen, which had en-
larged from about 1/2 lb (0.2 kg) to more than 14 
lb (6.4 kg). Moore improved quickly after the sur-
gery. Golde took a sample from the spleen and 
isolated and cultured an immortal cell line ca-
pable of producing a variety of valuable products, 
including the lymphokine granulocyte–macro-
phage colony-stimulating factor. In 1983, UCLA 
applied for and was granted a patent on the cell 
line. Moore had been returning to California to 
see Golde about every 6 months. He told an in-
terviewer that he never would have known about 
the existence of the cell line had Golde not called 
him in September 1983 and told him he had 
“missigned the consent form” (circling I “do not” 
grant instead of I “do” grant UCLA all rights in 
“any cell line”). Moore consulted an attorney and 
filed suit against UCLA and Golde in 1984.6
Moore in the Court of Appeals
The trial court decided that Moore had no rights 
to his cells. Moore brought his case to a Califor-
nia Court of Appeals, which in 1988 reversed the 
trial court’s decision.7 Judge David Rothman, 
writing for the 2-to-1 majority, focused on just 
one issue: If Moore could prove the facts he al-
leged regarding “conversion” — or theft — of his 
cells, would he win the lawsuit under California 
law? Conversion involves a civil lawsuit that es-
sentially claims that a defendant wrongfully took 
or retains the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff 
must prove ownership or right to possession of 
the property at the time of the conversion, wrong-
ful conversion or disposal of the property, and 
damages.
According to California statute, “The owner-
ship of a thing [property] is the right of one or 
more persons to possess and use it to the exclu-
sion of others.” Although we are unaccustomed 
to thinking of the human body as property, the 
court noted that “the essence of property inter-
est — and the ultimate right of control . . . ex-
ists with regard to one’s own body.” This finding 
negated the defendants’ position that everyone 
but the source of the cells could own them. 
Similarly, the defendants’ contention that a dis-
eased spleen that has been removed from a pa-
tient is a thing of no value was negated by the 
fact that the cells from the spleen formed the 
foundation of a multimillion-dollar industry.
The defendants next argued that the removed 
spleen was “medical waste” that Moore aban-
doned for the physicians to dispose of as they 
saw fit; consequently, there was no conversion or 
wrongful disposal. Rothman found that if the 
spleen had been disposed of by “internment or 
incineration,” in accordance with the usual prac-
tice, Moore could not complain. But the judge 
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concluded, “Any use . . . not within the ac-
cepted understanding of the patient is a conver-
sion” because it cannot be presumed “that the 
patient is indifferent to” other uses, such as 
commercial exploitation.7 The dissenting judge 
would have dismissed the case because he found 
Moore’s claim trivial, and the tissue to be “like 
unformed clay or stone transformed by the 
hands of a master sculptor into a valuable work 
of art.”7 The dissenting judge also thought that 
allowing patients to sell or otherwise profit from 
their organs and tissues would impede medical 
progress.7
Since Moore was not claiming that his spleen 
itself was valuable but rather that Golde had 
used it to make a product of value, and since 
there was no precedent directly on this point, 
the appeals court opinion offers novel argu-
ments on the question of who owns the result 
when raw materials are converted into a valu-
able product. For example, under ancient Roman 
law, when agricultural crops were in the ground, 
they were owned by the landowner, but picked 
fruits and vegetables were owned by the farmer 
who worked the land. Trees taken from the 
land, however, belonged to the landowner. Is a 
removed spleen more like an ear of corn or an 
oak tree? Is Moore like a landowner (who owns 
his body) and the doctor like a farmer (who 
plucks fruit)? Rothman made another analogy 
to refute the conclusion that a diseased spleen is 
worthless. He noted that even though a land-
owning farmer might pay an oil company to re-
move oil that is ruining the corn crop, the farm-
er is still entitled to a share of the refinery’s 
profits from the product of the land.7 Likewise, 
even if the physician–researcher owns the creat-
ed cell line, he may still owe the patient some-
thing. 
Since the cells in human tissue are living and 
reproduce, perhaps they are more analogous to 
farm animals than to fruits or vegetables. The 
progeny of animals are the property of the moth-
er’s owner. Is the cell line equivalent to Moore’s 
“progeny”? Similarly, an owner wrongfully de-
prived of livestock is owed the value of the eggs 
from converted chickens and milk from convert-
ed cows.6 Are Moore’s immortal cells like chick-
ens, and the protein products derived from them 
like eggs? The need to resort to cases that in-
volve the ownership of corn, trees, cows, and eggs 
demonstrates the need to create modern rules 
that deal directly with the ownership and use of 
human tissue.
Moore in the California Supreme Court
The California Supreme Court ignored all of these 
potentially useful, if somewhat amusing, prop-
erty analogies. It simply decided that Moore’s 
physician should have disclosed his financial in-
terest in using his patient’s spleen for research 
and commerce but that Moore had no property 
interest in his cells after they had been removed 
from his body.2
The court’s reasoning was straightforward but 
unsophisticated. The court noted, for example, 
that California statutes that govern the disposi-
tion of excised tissue do not give property rights 
to patients but failed to note that these statutes 
deal only with tissue removed from corpses. The 
court also argued that the patented cell line was 
“both factually and legally distinct from the 
cells taken from Moore’s body.”2 This is true, 
but as the appeals court noted, it does not mean 
that Moore has no interest in the fruits of the 
discoveries that required the use of his unique 
cells.
The underlying reason for the California Su-
preme Court’s ruling against Moore on the issue 
of property can be found in its statement of pub-
lic policy: “The extension of conversion law into 
this area will hinder research by restricting ac-
cess to the necessary raw materials [and] destroy 
the economic incentive to conduct important med-
ical research.”2
Greenberg v.  Miami Children’s
The next major case was from Florida.4 The plain-
tiffs were families affected by Canavan disease, a 
spongiform degeneration of the central nervous 
system. They had persuaded Dr. Reuben Matalon 
to try to identify the gene responsible for the dis-
ease and were active creators and supporters of 
the research, not merely tissue providers. They 
created and maintained the Canavan Registry, a 
repository for their tissue samples and medical 
information, and engaged Matalon with the goal 
of developing an affordable and widely accessible 
genetic test for Canavan disease. Matalon success-
fully identified the gene and subsequently devel-
oped prenatal and carrier tests for the disease.
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Without the plaintiffs’ knowledge, Matalon 
obtained a patent for the relevant genetic se-
quence, thereby securing the rights of his em-
ployer, Miami Children’s Hospital Research In-
stitute, to control genetic testing for Canavan 
disease in clinical care as well as research. Mi-
ami Children’s exercised its patent rights in a 
way that the plaintiffs believed defeated the 
purpose for which they had joined forces with 
Matalon in the first place. They had not provid-
ed resources (tissue samples, information, and 
funds) with the understanding that these re-
sources would be used for the economic benefit 
of Matalon or his institution but had done so to 
develop an affordable diagnostic test. The plain-
tiffs had six specific claims, and the trial judge 
dismissed five of them.4
One claim was similar to one made in Moore 
— the wrongful conversion of the plaintiffs’ 
property, with the property being the samples 
(and the information derived from them) held in 
the Canavan Registry. The judge noted that un-
der Florida law, conversion “is an unauthorized 
act which deprives another of his property per-
manently or for an indefinite time.” Application 
of this law involves two inquiries: whether prop-
erty was involved, and if so, whether the requi-
site deprivation or misuse of that property oc-
curred. The trial judge declined “to find a 
property interest in body tissue and genetic in-
formation voluntarily given to defendants.” 4 This 
conclusion was based primarily on the fact that 
under Florida law “the property right in blood 
and tissue samples . . . evaporates once the sam-
ple is voluntarily given to a third party.” 4
Nevertheless, the judge went on to consider 
whether the tissue samples were used for a pur-
pose unintended by the plaintiffs. He found that 
the tissue samples were used only for medical re-
search (as intended by the plaintiffs) and so con-
cluded that there could be no liability for conver-
sion. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that they 
had not provided samples to be used for com-
mercial purposes, he drew a distinction between 
commercialization of the material in the Canavan 
Registry and commercialization of the fruits of 
the research conducted by using the material 
in the registry. In this case, the fruits were iden-
tified as the patented material (the genetic se-
quence).
Similar to the ruling by the California Su-
preme Court in Moore, the Florida ruling reflected 
the judge’s concern that a finding for the plain-
tiffs would “cripple medical research.” 4 This 
ruling, then, was as pragmatic and result-driven 
as that in Moore, but it does add another ele-
ment: in Moore, the property at issue comprised 
the tissue and the cells that were produced from 
it; in Greenberg, the property questions involved 
the tissue and access to a diagnostic test devel-
oped using the tissue. In both cases, patents were 
used to make the products derived from the tis-
sue more valuable.
The C ase of William C atalona
The Missouri dispute began when Dr. William 
Catalona, a prominent researcher on prostate can-
cer, decided to leave Washington University in St. 
Louis for Northwestern University in Chicago and 
to take “his” tissue samples with him.5 These 
samples were collected from patients who had 
signed research consent forms that authorized the 
storage and use of their tissue for future research. 
Before leaving, Catalona sent 10,000 letters to his 
former patients asking them to sign and return an 
enclosed form that read as follows:
I have donated a tissue and/or blood sam-
ple for Dr. William J. Catalona’s research 
studies. Please release all samples to Dr. 
Catalona at Northwestern University upon 
his request. I have entrusted these samples 
to Dr. Catalona to be used only at his di-
rection and with his express consent for 
research projects.5
Six thousand patients returned completed 
forms. Washington University filed suit against 
Catalona, asking the court to declare that the 
university was the exclusive owner of the tissue 
repository and the samples in it.
According to the reasoning in Moore and Mata-
lon, people own their tissues when the tissues are 
part of their bodies, but ownership becomes less 
clear once it is separated from the body. None-
theless, the tissues still must be controlled by 
someone, whether for proper disposal or other 
use. And the way law thinks about control of ob-
jects is through property law, especially when 
there is a transfer from one entity to another. The 
transfer of property usually takes one of two 
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forms — a sale or a gift. Since the tissues were 
not sold in Catalona, the question was whether a 
gift was made, and if so, to whom.
Catalona’s form letter indicates that he be-
lieved the tissue was “donated” to him — that 
he was the recipient of a gift. But if this were 
so, he would have no reason to write the letter 
to the donors in the first place. If the tissue was 
a gift to Catalona, he could have asked the uni-
versity directly to transfer “his” blood and tissue 
samples. If a grateful patient had given Catalona 
a first-edition medical text, when Catalona 
moved to a new university he would not have 
asked that patient to write to the university ask-
ing it to transfer the book to him. He would 
simply have taken it with him. Alternatively, if 
the patient had given the book to the university 
library, even in Catalona’s name, he could not 
take it without the university’s permission.
A gift consists of three elements: First, the 
donor must have the present intent to make a 
gift. Second, the property must be transferred 
from the donor to the recipient. Finally, the re-
cipient must accept the gift, at which moment it 
belongs to the recipient. Once a gift is made, 
the donor has no further property interest. It is, 
nonetheless, possible to make a conditional gift. 
For example, a person could create an endow-
ment for a university to conduct cancer research, 
but no other type of research, with a stipulation 
that the money be returned if it is ever used for 
another purpose. A person can also condition a 
gift on the occurrence of an event. A case cited 
by the appeals court involved the ownership of 
an engagement ring given in contemplation of 
marriage when the wedding was called off. The 
court ruled that the ring was to become a gift at 
the time of the wedding. Because the groom 
cancelled the wedding, and the bride was pre-
pared to marry and meet the condition of the 
gift, the court decided that the ring was hers.5,8
The appeals court agreed with the trial court 
that an unconditional gift of tissue was made to 
Washington University, not to Catalona. The 
court based this conclusion on its findings that 
the consent forms signed by the patients were 
Washington University forms, the patients were 
directed to university personnel for answers to 
questions, the university controlled and paid for 
the repository, and the university controlled the 
use of the samples. Moreover, Catalona was at 
all times employed by the university and worked 
on its behalf, and there was no indication that 
any patient had made a direct gift to him.5,9
The Confusion
The conflicts that ultimately brought these cases 
to court were the result of confusion over who 
had ultimate control of the tissue samples from 
which various products were derived. The confu-
sion was shared by the physicians who collected 
the samples, the institutions that stored the sam-
ples, the people who provided the samples, and 
the corporations that patented the products. 
Analysis of the court opinions also demonstrates 
a profound lack of clarity in the minds of the 
judges as to what types of law should be used to 
resolve the novel legal questions presented. Since 
there are virtually no judicial precedents, the 
courts have had to resort to analogies that have 
proven difficult to apply and have sometimes cre-
ated more confusion than clarity in the law.
An example of role confusion is found in the 
form, titled “Medical Consent and Authoriza-
tion,” that Catalona sent to his patients. Despite 
its title, this document is not a medical consent 
form; it is simply a request to transfer property. 
This is a mischaracterization, but how should 
we characterize people who provide their tissue 
for banking? Throughout the Catalona opinion, 
they are referred to as research participants.5 
Both parties to the lawsuit and the courts ap-
parently viewed research participants and tissue 
providers as identical. But this is a serious con-
ceptual error that adds more problems to the 
matter of tissue collection, storage, and use 
than it purports to solve.
Research subjects have substantial rights. In 
addition to consenting at the outset, they have 
the right to discontinue playing the role of re-
search subject at any time.10 They never make 
an irrevocable “gift” of themselves. A person 
can be in a clinical trial and not provide tissue. 
But a person can also provide tissue and not be 
a research subject. When these two distinct 
roles are confused, problems are created. The 
distinct roles are easier to see when other types 
of property are involved. For example, a subject 
in a clinical trial may give the researcher a com-
puter and thus be a both a research subject and 
a donor. As a research subject, she can, under 
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the law, terminate her participation in the re-
search, but she is not entitled to get the com-
puter back because it was a gift over which she 
has lost control. Tissue donors are no more re-
search subjects than computer donors are.
This role confusion also exists in the minds 
of federal regulators. Current guidance from the 
Office for Human Research Protections states: 
“Under the definition of human subject at 45 
CFR 46.102(f), obtaining identifiable private in-
formation or identifiable specimens for research 
purposes constitutes human subjects research. 
Obtaining means receiving or accessing identi-
fiable private information or identifiable speci-
mens for research purposes.”11
As the Catalona court points out, the guid-
ance issued by this office — as opposed to reg-
ulation — is not law and is not binding. The 
Office for Human Research Protections argues 
that the mere obtaining of “identifiable speci-
mens” for “research purposes” is itself research. 
According to this definition, it is possible for 
there to be a research subject in the complete 
absence of any research. The collection of mon-
ey, equipment, personnel — or tissue samples 
— in the contemplation of research, which may 
or may not ever be conducted, is not research. 
The Office for Human Research Protections 
thus makes the same conceptual error the courts 
make. A piece of tissue, identifiable or not, con-
stitutes neither research nor a research subject. 
At some point it may be used for research, at 
which time identifiable information might be 
derived about the donor, and it is the use of the 
tissue for research that requires human subject 
protection.
The classification of tissue providers as re-
search subjects also raises the difficult and un-
resolved problem of terminating participation 
— if tissue providers are the same as research 
subjects, they should be able to discontinue 
their participation at any time. But what does 
this mean? Catalona argued this meant that tis-
sue providers continue to have control over sam-
ples and can have the samples returned to them 
or transferred to someone else, such as Catalo-
na. Washington University argued that discon-
tinuance meant that the university could destroy 
the samples, continue to store them without us-
ing them, or remove all identifiers from them. 
But if Washington University had been the re-
cipient of an unconditional gift, as it argued, 
the tissue provider could not require any of 
these actions. It is as if the generous donor who 
made a gift of the first-edition textbook could at 
any time require the library to destroy the book 
or remove it from use. This makes no sense as a 
matter of law.
The Catalona case nonetheless helps clarify 
the legal status of human tissue. It is property. 
It starts out as the property of the person from 
whom it is taken, it can be given by the person 
to an institution or to another person, and the 
nature of the gift is determined by the intent of 
the giver. Traditional standards of property law 
apply to human tissue removed from a living 
person.5 On the other hand, by confusing tissue 
providers with human subjects — and gift law 
with human subject regulations — the case also 
adds to the current confusion.12
Resolving the Confusion
Resolving the confusion requires a recognition 
that the rules of protection for human subjects 
cannot reasonably be applied to tissue donation. 
Collecting and storing human tissue is not re-
search, nor is it new, experimental, or even con-
troversial. Human tissue is treated as property 
under the law, but the continuing controversies 
about the appropriate use of human tissue, in-
cluding its use as a commercial product, suggest 
that human-tissue donation needs its own rules 
and standards. Agreement on such standards has 
eluded tissue collectors to date, but Catalona may 
provide the catalyst to move us to the next phase: 
regulating tissue donation and banking by creat-
ing, by means of statute or best practices, a for-
malized process for tissue donation. Analogies 
to crops, livestock, oil, and even books and com-
puters are simply inadequate.
A formalized process for human-tissue dona-
tion should require explicit recognition that a 
gift is being made, should identify the recipient 
of the gift, and should specify whether the gift 
is conditional or unconditional. If a conditional 
gift is intended, the donor must specify the con-
ditions, including any requirement that the tis-
sue be destroyed if those conditions are not met. 
The statutory approach would be to draft a law 
similar to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 
which governs the donation of dead bodies and 
tissue removed from corpses. Such a law would 
(or at least should) also determine under what 
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circumstances, if any, people would be permit-
ted to sell their tissue and what buyers could do 
with it. Current federal law, for example, pro-
hibits the purchase or sale of human organs for 
transplantation, and current national voluntary 
guidelines prohibit the purchase and sale of hu-
man ova, at least for stem-cell research.13,14
Clear rules for collecting and storing human 
tissue would benefit both collectors and provid-
ers.15 On the other hand, it is worth emphasizing 
that these rules will not resolve the question of 
what can be done with the stored tissues — in 
either existing or future collections. The reason is 
that before it was possible to analyze DNA, the 
primary legal issue was the property issue ad-
dressed in Moore: Who owned the tissue and its 
products? With the advent of DNA analysis, the 
property question has been joined with a privacy 
question: What can be done with the personal, 
private information encoded in human tissue? 
This issue is starkly presented, for example, by 
the “consent and legal agreement” form used by 
23andMe, one of the new Web-based personal ge-
netics companies. The form states that “after 
analysis, your remaining DNA and saliva samples 
will be destroyed.” The agreement also states, 
however, that the information derived from the 
DNA can be used by the company and its partners 
“as part of our scientific research with the pur-
pose of advancing the field of genetics.” We have 
previously suggested a comprehensive law protect-
ing genetic privacy to address this concern.16,17 Of 
course, if the stored tissue samples cannot be 
linked to individual donors, the privacy issue dis-
appears and property concepts can be used exclu-
sively to establish tissue-bank practices.
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